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AMORY SAYS

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REDS NOT READY TO RISK MAJOR NUCLEAR CONFLICT

Robert Amory, Jr., one of the handful of Americans who know most about Soviet plans for peace or war, said in Columbia Tuesday night Russia is not ready to risk a major nuclear conflict.

Amory, deputy chief for intelligence of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, said the Soviets "haven't got what it takes rationally to challenge us this spring."

But he said the future remains in doubt.

Amory spoke in Russell House auditorium at the University of South Carolina as the fifth and final lecturer in the series, "An age of Struggle," sponsored by the USC Department of International Studies. Dr. Richard L. Walker, head of the Department, introduced Amory.

His lecture at the University was Amory's first on-the-record address in approximately four years. As deputy chief for intelligence, his position in CIA is one of the most critical in the federal government.

In line with his announced subject, "The Long-Range Soviet Challenge," Amory considered the 30-year period 1945-75. He said, "Soviet leaders and philosophers think in large gobs of time."

He said, "As to what the Soviets will do in 1960 or 1965, they don't know and we don't know."

Reviewing the accomplishments of the Communist regime, he said, "obviously they have come a long, long way."

He said Russia today has a confident, full-blown system of diplomacy.

Stalin's methods were "crude and violent in the extreme," Amory said, and Stalin used violence when, he could have used other methods to attain his objectives.

But with Stalin's death in 1953, and for the succeeding two years, the Soviet Union performed "an about face rivaling anything in history without compulsion from outside." As examples he cited the ending of the Korean War and comparable developments.

As for the present Berlin crisis, Amory said this is taking place now because the existence of Berlin with its high pro-Western standards within East Germany is a "needle" to the Communists when it is compared with the drab life in the surrounding Communist-dominated area.

Furthermore, he said, the Soviets constantly have to do something about raising the morale of the East German regime, and feel the need to test Western solidarity.

"The goal," he said, "is to take over Berlin and consolidate East Germany. They think they hold the trumps because their action is peaceful. It's a case of 'here we go, here they come.'"

The Soviet policy is based on confidence, Amory said. The belief their growth rate is power and basic internal strength assures them of preeminence in a comparatively brief span of time, he said.

Soviet education, he said, is being expanded without sacrifice of quality.

Although Russia's gross national product is only 45 per cent of Americans, the Soviets are investing much more heavily in capital growth, and their conversion of basic materials to essentials is far higher than that of the United States, percentagewise.

"The Russians are far behind us in the production of consumer goods," Amory said, "but in some fields it is respectable."

Moreover, he said, the Soviets "are making enough improvement each year in the production of consumer goods so that the citizen believes his interests are being protected."

Police terror in the Soviet Union is being "drastically abated" because it is no longer necessary for social control, Amory said.

Political developments cited by Amory as significant are "the emergence of Krushchev as the unchallenged personal leader" of the Soviet Union, and the present status of the Central Committee, which he said had been a "rubber stamp under Stalin."

Amory said Krushchev is the "chief spokesman" for the Central Committee. Krushchev is not yet a dictator, Amory said, commenting that he "would be surprised if he did become a dictator."

Out of the attitude of the Central Committee comes a national confidence that at the end of the 39-year period the Soviet Union will have a yearly gross national product of \$500 billion, consumer standards compared to western Europe, \$100 billion yearly to spend on armaments or "external investment" and other assets.

In this Russian outlook there is the assumption that there will be no major nuclear war in the meantime, Amory said.

He said that a year and a half ago Soviet leaders were told that a 15-year peace was imperative. Their economy is by no means mobilized for war or preparing for war," he said. "The strike a balance between military and other expenditures as we do."

But, he said, the Soviet Union might go to war under certain circumstances, and might have done so if the United States had aided the Hungarian revolutionists. "We don't know," he said.

Amory said the Soviet Union would fight although not ready if circumstances forced a war, "and if they do it will not be a half-hearted fight." The Soviets believe, he said, that the outcome of a war must be the other nations would have to adopt some form of Communist-like government.

Amory said that if war came it would take place as the result of one of three types of actions: a local action started by the Soviet Union; a local action started by the West; or an action started by "someone else" such as the revolution in Hungary or the Israeli-Egyptian conflict.

As for the "brush-fire war" problem--the type of limited action designed to push the West back toward its national frontiers--Amory said that he believes this danger is "vastly exaggerated." Korea and Indo-China he classified as "exceptions."

Soviet leaders realize the disastrous effect on world opinion generated by "visible aggression." He said, "They already control one billion of the world's people and their large assets" and the Soviets realize that they must show how the Communist system works with these people.

"The fundamental dynamics of the Soviet Union today," Amory said, "is intensive vertical building on the present power base rather than by broadening the base."

He said Russian in some instances follows a policy of "adventurism" which involves Soviet prestige and other stakes in non-critical cases.

Referring again to Berlin Amory described it as a "tough case to pigeonhole" because it is within the red sphere and required the West to "raise the ante of force."

He said that although the Soviet Union is not ready to risk a major nuclear war over Berlin, Krushchev "expects to force us to chicken out."

Amory declared, "If the West is resolute, then I believe that the Soviet Union--by hook or crook--will be the ones to back down."

In the next 15 years, Amory foresees, the Soviets will:

1. Insist on "Sputnik diplomacy" by demanding recognition of achievements with a "We're as big as you are" attitude.
2. Maintain a rigid stand to hold to the status quo where the Red flag now flies.
3. Insist on the right to talk bilaterally with the United States and if the United States does not agree, to bring along to talks a collection of other nations to offset U.S. allies.
4. Become strong enough and self-possessed enough to enter into deals for security advantages.
5. Continue to work on people within other nations to produce trouble, although Amory sees the Soviets developing subtlety which is a contrast to the days of Stalin.
6. Show further willingness to get along with instrumentalities (people, governments) over which they have no control.
7. Develop more effort on the economic side getting away from the idea of self-sufficiency.
8. Continue their effective "no strings" foreign aid policy toward nations not actual allies or even invited to become allies.

The next 15 years are "extremely crucial," Amory said.

"We face a race for leadership in the world against militant Communists with fervent faith," he said.

He cautioned, "We must never tempt them into a major military path while letting down our strength."